Security review pack
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Answers to the questions vendor and IT security reviews ask about the Screshot Chrome extension, on one page you can save as PDF. Last reviewed October 30, 2026.
1. Summary
| Product | Screshot, a Chrome extension for capturing, blurring and annotating screenshots |
| Distribution | Chrome Web Store, extension ID ikhdemckhflgmlijkaomcpdmljegkakh |
| Users | 20,000+ on the Chrome Web Store |
| Price | Capture, blur and annotation are free for individuals and organizations. Sharing includes 1 GB of encrypted storage per account at no charge. |
| Customer data processed by Screshot | None for capture and editing. For screenshots a user chooses to share: end-to-end encrypted image files that Screshot cannot decrypt, plus account and sharing metadata |
| Network requests during capture and editing | None |
| User accounts | Optional, only to share. Google sign-in; no passwords |
| Encryption of shared screenshots | End-to-end: AES-256-GCM per screenshot, keys exchanged with ECDH P-256, unlocked by a passkey or recovery code |
| Certifications | None today (no SOC 2 or ISO 27001) |
| Security contact | security@screshot.com |
2. Data flow
- The user starts a capture with the toolbar icon, a keyboard shortcut or the right-click menu. Chrome then grants temporary access to that one tab (activeTab).
- Chrome renders the visible area. For a full page, the extension scrolls the tab, stitches the parts in memory and restores the page.
- The image opens in a page packaged inside the extension (chrome-extension://). It loads no remote code, fonts or analytics.
- The user blurs, crops and annotates. Blur is written into the pixels.
- The user copies the image to the clipboard or downloads a PNG. Closing the tab discards it. Nothing has left the device.
To verify: open chrome://extensions, enable Developer mode, inspect Screshot's service worker and watch the Network tab while capturing. No requests leave the browser.
Sharing by link (optional, end-to-end encrypted)
- Optional. The user clicks Share and signs in with Google (chrome.identity), the first time only.
- The first share sets up the user's encryption keys in the browser: an ECDH P-256 key pair whose private key is wrapped by a passkey (WebAuthn PRF) or a recovery code.
- The browser creates a random AES-256-GCM key for this screenshot and encrypts the edited image and a thumbnail with it.
- Only the encrypted files are uploaded to Cloudflare R2. The key is stored wrapped for the owner's public key, never in plain form.
- Invited people get the key wrapped for their own public key. For an Anyone with the link share, the key is placed after the # of the link, which browsers do not send to servers.
- Viewers' browsers fetch the encrypted file through a signed address that expires within minutes, and decrypt it locally.
To verify: share a screenshot and inspect the upload. The body is a file of encrypted bytes beginning with SCE1, not an image, and no request carries the key.
3. Permissions
| Permission | Used for | Cannot |
|---|---|---|
activeTab | Capture the tab in front of you, only at the moment you click the icon or use a shortcut. | Read other tabs, run in the background, or see your browsing history. |
scripting | Read the zoom level of the tab you capture, so blur fits the size of its text, and scroll that tab during a full-page capture, then put it back exactly as it was. | Run on any page you did not ask Screshot to capture. |
contextMenus | Add "Capture visible area" and "Capture full page" to the right-click menu on the Screshot icon. | Change menus on web pages or read what you click. |
storage | Keep your Screshot sign-in, the extension’s settings and the counts that decide when to ask you for a rating on the Chrome Web Store on this device, in the extension’s own storage. The settings and counts are never sent; the sign-in is used only to talk to Screshot when you share. | Read cookies, passwords or anything websites store. |
identity | Open Google sign-in in its own window when you choose to share, without leaving the editor. | See your Google password or sign you in to anything but Screshot. |
No host permissions and no access to history, cookies or downloads.
4. Data inventory
| System | Personal data | Where it is kept |
|---|---|---|
| Extension | The sign-in token and account email, if the user shares; the extension's settings and the counts that decide when to ask for a Store rating, never sent | Extension storage on the user's device |
| Accounts | Email, name, profile picture address and Google ID of users who share | PostgreSQL (AWS eu-central-1) |
| Shared screenshots | Encrypted image and thumbnail; title, size, dimensions, mode, dates, view count | Encrypted files in Cloudflare R2; metadata in PostgreSQL (AWS eu-central-1) |
| Encryption keys | Public keys, and private and per-screenshot keys in wrapped (encrypted) form only | PostgreSQL (AWS eu-central-1) |
| Invitations | Invited email addresses and access requests | PostgreSQL (AWS eu-central-1); invitation emails sent with Amazon SES |
| Website visit counts | Aggregate page views, no cookies, no identifiers | Cloudflare Web Analytics, on the website only |
| Uninstall survey | Reason picked and extension version, as daily totals | PostgreSQL (AWS eu-central-1) |
| Deployment help form | Name, work email, company, team size, topic and message | Sanity, in records that are not publicly readable |
| Messages to us | Whatever a person includes in an email | Our email provider |
5. Subprocessors
Capture and editing use no subprocessors. The website and optional sharing use these services:
| Service | Purpose | Scope |
|---|---|---|
| Amazon Web Services | Servers that run sharing (database and API), disk backups, and invitation and access-request emails (Amazon SES), in eu-central-1 (Frankfurt) | Sharing |
| Cloudflare | Website delivery and cookieless visit counts; R2 storage and delivery of encrypted files (img.screshot.com); API delivery; encrypted database backups (R2, EU) | Website and sharing |
| Sign-in (OAuth) | Sharing | |
| Sanity | Blog content and the deployment help form | Website only |
6. Questionnaire answers
- Does the product store, process or transmit customer data?
- Not for capture and editing: screenshots stay on the user's device. If a user chooses to share a screenshot, Screshot stores it end-to-end encrypted, along with the account and sharing metadata listed above. Screshot cannot decrypt the image.
- Which network connections does the extension make?
- None during capture, editing, copy or download. It contacts screshot.com only when the user signs in or shares, and opens screshot.com pages in normal tabs for the welcome guide after a manual install and the optional uninstall survey.
- Does it include analytics, telemetry or third-party scripts?
- No. Nothing is loaded from remote servers, and there is no analytics or crash reporting in the extension.
- Which browser permissions does it request?
- activeTab, scripting, contextMenus, storage, identity. None triggers an install warning, and there are no host permissions. See the table above.
- Can it read other tabs, browsing history or cookies?
- No. activeTab gives access only to the tab the user chooses to capture, only at that moment.
- Is data encrypted in transit and at rest?
- Yes. Everything is served over HTTPS, and shared screenshots are end-to-end encrypted in the browser before upload (AES-256-GCM), so they are encrypted at rest with keys Screshot does not hold. Details in the security overview.
- Can Screshot staff view shared screenshots?
- No. Staff can see metadata such as titles and invited emails, but not images. The only exception is an abuse report whose reporter chooses to include the key, so moderators can review that one screenshot.
- What happens if a user loses their passkey?
- They unlock with their recovery code and can then add a new passkey. If both are lost, their shared screenshots cannot be decrypted by anyone, including Screshot.
- Does it support SSO, SCIM or role-based access?
- No SSO or SCIM today. Capture needs no account. Sharing uses Google sign-in. Teams use workspaces with owner, admin and member roles: owners and admins invite and remove members. Each owner chooses who can open each screenshot: Only me, Invited people, Workspace or Anyone with the link.
- How is data deleted?
- Users delete screenshots themselves. Screenshots in the trash are erased from both the database and storage after 30 days, or at once with Delete forever. Deleting an account in Settings erases its data at once. Copies in encrypted backups expire within 31 days.
- How is it deployed and removed?
- Force-install with the Google Admin console, Microsoft Intune, Group Policy or a macOS profile, and remove it from the same policy. See the deployment guide.
- How are updates delivered and reviewed?
- Through the Chrome Web Store, which reviews each version. If a new version requests a permission that shows a warning, Chrome disables it until the user or admin approves.
- Can admins control which version runs?
- Chrome policy can allow, block or force-install the extension by ID. Pinning a specific version is not supported by the Chrome Web Store.
- Has the product had an independent penetration test?
- Not yet. We will share results with customers under NDA once one is complete.
- How do you handle vulnerabilities?
- Report them to security@screshot.com. We acknowledge reports and ask for reasonable time to fix before public disclosure.
- How will you notify us of security incidents or material changes?
- We publish changes to permissions or data handling on the security page and privacy policy before releasing the version that makes them.
7. Planned changes
We plan a Chrome policy that lets admins keep sharing turned off for the whole organization, and an independent penetration test. Changes to the data flow, stored data or subprocessors will be published here first.
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